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THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL 
ACT-INDUSTRIAL CHALLENGES TO EFFLUENT 
LIMITATIONS 
James E. McKinnon* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 19721 
launched a head-on attack on water pollution in the United States, 
declaring that henceforth any discharge of pollutants into the na-
tion's water is unlawful unless it complies with the provisions of the 
legislation.2 The Act covers every "point source"3 in the country and 
mandates that every industry that discharges waste water, from the 
smallest printing shop to the largest steel mill, must meet effluent 
limitations4 promulgated by the United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA). 5 
Economic consequences have made effluent limitations contro-
versial from the beginning. Testifying against passage of the Act, 
representatives of industry predicted widespread plant closings and 
* B.S., University of North Carolina, 1977; J.D. expected 1980, Wake Forest University 
School of Law. 
I Pub. L. No. 92-500, §§ 1-13,89 Stat. 816 (1972) codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24; 15 U.S.C. §§ 
633, 636; 31 U.S.C. § 711; 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-65, 1251-92, 1311-28, 1341-45, 1361-76 (1976) 
[hereinafter cited as the 1972 Act or the Act J. 4> 
2 [d. § 1311(a). These provisions include procedures for the acquisition of a permit which 
specifies the levels at which a pollutant can be discharged. [d. § 1342. 
3 A "point source" is "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not 
limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling 
stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged." [d. § 1362(14). 
• An "effluent limitation" is a restriction "on quantities, rates and concentrations of chemi-
cal, physical, biological, and other constituents which are discharged. . . including schedules 
of compliance." [d. § 1362(11). 
5 EPA's authority to issue actual limitations (and not just guidelines to be used by permit 
writers) was confirmed in E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977). 
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resulting unemployment.8 To help prevent these problems, the Act 
specifically requires EPA to consider the potential economic conse-
quences of an effluent limitation while it is being developed.7 Never-
theless, the probable costs to industry guaranteed legal challenges, 
which indeed began soon after the publication of the first effluent 
regulations.8 
The purpose of this article is to describe and catalog the different 
types of industrial challenges to effluent limitatins and to define the 
standards that these limitations must meet in order to withstand 
such judicial challenges.· The first section describes EPA's statutory 
mandate to develop effluent limitations. The second section out-
lines the general legal requirements for the limitations. Finally, the 
third section describes individually the procedural, statutory and 
substantive challenges to effluent limitations. 
n. TYPES OF EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS REQUIRED BY THE 1972 AND 1977 
AMENDMENTS 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 
requires EPA to develop effluent limitations on an industry-by-
industry basis. IO Under the Act, the discharge of effluents is to be 
reduced over several years and industrial pollution control methods 
are to reach increasingly sophisticated technological levels to ac-
complish this goal. lI By 1977 all industries had to install the "best 
practicable control technology currently available"12 and, by 1983, 
they must be using the "best available technology economically 
achievable."13 
• See Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution, 95th Cong., 
1st Sess. Part 10. 
7 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(b)(I)(B), (2)(B), 1316(b)(I)(B) (1976). 
• EPA completed promulgation of the first round of regulations on December 17, 1973, and 
the first real challenge to them by industry came in American Paper Inst. v. Train, 381 F. 
Supp. 553 (D.D.C. 1974). 
• Due to the scope of the subject, this paper is limited to industrial challenges to effluent 
limitations. 
10 The discussion of the 1972 and 1977 Amendments which follows is a summary of an 
extremely complicated law. For a more complete discussion of these provisions, see Hall, The 
Clean Water Act of 1977, 11 NAT. REsOURCES LAw. 343-72 (1978). 
II This methodology was praised by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia as 
evidence of EPA's "commitment to the development of sound gUidelines." National Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 712-13 n.l05 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
12 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(I)(A) (1976). 
13 [d. § 1311 (b )(2)(A). 
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The "practicable" technology standardl4 generally depends on the 
level of pollution control achieved by the plants in an industrial 
category that have the most effective pollution control technology. 15 
The level of pollution control that these "exemplary plants" achieve 
is, in effect, averaged, and this average level then becomes the tech-
nology level that the rest of the industrial subcategory must 
achieve. IS 
The "available" technology standard, on the other hand, is some-
what more demanding. Courts have interpreted this standard to be 
the level of pollution control producible by the best technology that 
can reasonably be expected to be available in 1983. 17 
The 1972 Act also requires EPA to promulgate standards of per-
formance for new industrial waste sources on the basis of "best 
available demonstrated control technology."ls If a business begins 
construction of a plant after proposed effluent limitations are pub-
lished, that plant is treated as a "new source."19 
The "new-source" performance standards rest on a combination 
of the "practicable" and "available" technologies; the particular 
technology utilized depends on 'whether the 1983 "available" tech-
" Contrary to the trend in most opinions, see, e.g., American Iron and Steel Institute v. 
EPA, 568 F.2d 284 (3rd Cir. 1977), the Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 
has chosen to use shortened word descriptions for the technology standards rather than 
acronyms. Thus, "best practicable control technology currently available" is shortened to 
"practicable" technology rather than BPCTCA, "best available technology economically 
achievable" becomes "available" technology rather than BAT, and "best conventional pollu-
tion control technology" is "conventional" technology rather than BCPCT. The substitution 
is part of an effort to make our articles more readable by promoting the use of descriptive 
words rather than unpronounceable initials wherever possible. Acronyms are generally used 
on these pages only when their meaning is,so common or the words are repeated so often that 
spelling them out would be a waste of paper. See, Comment, The National Forest Manage-
ment Act of 1976: A Critical Examination, 7 B.C. ENv. An. L. REv. 99, 108-09 (1978) (waste 
of paper). 
I. When no exemplary plants are found in an industry, i.e., no plants with effective pollu-
tion control technology, EPA "transfers" technology from another industry. See section 
IV(c)(3), infra. 
I. If, for example, the three most exemplary plants in an industrial subcategory can reduce 
the level of a pollutant in their effluent to 0.01, 0.03, and 0.05 parts per million, the level of 
pollution reduction which the Act calls "practicable" would result in a reduction at 0.03 parts 
per million for that subcategory. 
17 See e.g., E. 1. duPont de Nemours v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018,1032 (4th Cir. 1976), modified, 
430 U.S. 112 (1977). The circuit courts have differed considerably on the question of what 
can reasonably be expected in 1983. 
18 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a) (1976). These standards are commonly called new source perform-
ance standards. 
I' [d. § 1316(a)(2). 
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nology standard has yet been demonstrated. 
EPA develops the different effluent limitations for each technol-
ogy through a series of steps.20 The Agency initially divides each 
major industrial category, such as wood products, into separate in-
dustries, such as pulp, paper, timber and textiles. These industries 
are then further divided into subcategories. After full technical and 
economic studies of each of the subcategories are provided by pri-
vate contractors, EPA issues a preliminary development document 
summarizing its findings on each industry. Public comments on 
these documents are then received and analyzed by the Agency. 
Based on this information, EPA proposes effluent limitations for 
each subcategory. Mter EPA receives more comments, it issues final 
limitations. Industry challenges either to this procedure or to the 
resulting technology-based standards comprise the bulk ofthe cases 
discussed in this article. 
In addition to technology-based, general effluent limitations, the 
1972 Act requires special standards for toxic pollutants. 21 Proposed 
regulations for specific toxic pollutants should have been published 
about nine months after the passage of the 1972 Act. 22 However, 
developing these standards has proved more difficult than Congress 
had anticipated, and they had not as yet been published when Con-
gress amended the Act again in 1977.23 In fact, EPA's difficulty in 
developing toxic pollutant standards was one of the main reasons 
for the 1977 Amendments. 24 
Other than the proposed special treatment of toxics, no differen-
tiation between types of pollutants was made in the 1972 Act. All 
point sources were required to achieve the required levels of pollu-
tion control by the required deadlines no matter what type of pollu-
tants they discharged. However, under the 1977 Amendments,25 pol-
lutants are divided into four categories: identified toxics,26 toxics 
20 These steps can be extracted to a certain extent from 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311, 1314, 1316, 
1317 (West 1978). A better view of the process can be obtained from a case study of a 
particular industry. See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 38746-66 (1979) (supplementary information to 
proposed effluent limitations guidelines for leather tanning and finishing industry). 
ZI 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (1976). 
22 Id . 
• 3 Hall, The Evolution and Implementation of EPA's Regulatory Program to Control the 
Discharge of Toxic Pollutants to the Nations Waters, 10 NAT. RESOURCES LAw. 507 (1977) . 
.. See 123 CONGo REC. 12926 (1977). 
2. Pub. L. No. 95-217, §§ 2-78, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977), to be codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-52, 
1254-56, 1259, 1262-63, 1281-88, 1291-92, 1294-97, 1311, 1314-15, 1317-19, 1321-24, 1325, 1341-
42, 1344-45, 1362, 1364, 1375-76 [hereinafter cited as the 1977 Amendments]. 
2, The 1972 Act required EPA to develop and publish a list of toxic pollutants. 33 U.S.C. 
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yet-to-be-named,27 conventional pollutants28 and all other pollu-
tants.21 For both kinds of toxics and for non-conventional pollutants, 
the "available" technology standard remains.- However, for con-
ventional pollutants, which include biological oxygen-demanding 
pollutants, suspended solids, fecal coliform and pH, a new "best 
conventional pollution control technology" standard applies.31 The 
"conventional" technology standard is defined as being at least as 
stringent as the "practicable" technology standard, but not more 
stringent than the "available" technology standard.32 The 1977 
Amendments also extend the "available" and "conventional" tech-
nology deadlines to July 1, 1984,33 and allow for case-by-case excep-
tions for non-toxic pollutants.34 In sum, for each pollutant category, 
the 1977 Amendments require a different combination of (1) the 
level of treatment, (2) the timetable for compliance and (3) the 
options for modification. 
m. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS 
An effluent limitation must meet the same standards as any other 
federal regulation. Judicial doctrines in administrative law forbid 
regulations which violate or exceed the scope of empowering legisla-
tion.36 In addition, regulations must satisfy the procedural and sub-
stantive requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).36 
§ 1317(a)(1) (1976). The 1977 Amendments changed the language slightly but do not substan· 
tially change that requirement. Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 53(a), 91 Stat. 1566 (1977), to be 
codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a). 
27 Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 53(a), 9fStat. 1566 (1977), to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a). 
28 The 1977 Amendments define conventional pollutants as including "pollutants classified 
as biological oxygen demanding, suspended solids, fecal coliform, and pH." [d. § 48(a), to be 
codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(4). 
28 The 1977 Amendments define all other pollutants by elimination. They are Bubstances 
not specifically designated as toxic by EPA or conventional by the 1972 Act. See id. § 43, to 
be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g)(1). Examples include oil and grease. Thermal pollution is 
not included in any of the three categories and is handled separately. [d. 
30 [d. § 42(a)(3), to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(2)(C), (D), (F). 
II [d. § 42(a)(3), to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(E). 
S2 H. Rep. No. 830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 85, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 4424, 4460. 
28 Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 42(a)(3), 91 Stat. 1566 (1977), to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) . 
.. [d. § 43, to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g). 
16 This area of the law involves the question of what is "fact" and what is "law," a question 
which has defied systematic characterization or treatment. For a discuBSion of some of the 
ways to look at this problem, see W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 427-86 (1974). 
30 5 U.S.C. Of 551-59, 701-06 (1976). The APA itself forbids regulations that are "in excess 
of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right." [d. § 706. 
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The APA requires that an agency give interested parties advance 
notice by publication of impending regulations so that they can 
have an opportunity to give their comments to the administrator 
and participate in the making of the regulations,31 The substantive 
requirements of the APA are applicable when an administrator 
possesses the authority to use his judgment in development a regu-
lation. Under the APA a reviewing court must set aside any dis-
cretionary agency action, findings and conclusions only if they are 
found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law."38 
In determining the validity of a regulation, a court must review 
the entire administrative record.3• In fact, the record upon which the 
agency made its decision is the only thing the reviewing court should 
examine when deciding whether the agency acted arbitrarily, capri-
ciously, in abuse of its discretion or otherwise unlawfully.40 Most 
importantly, the record must be complete. It should articulate the 
standards and details that governed the agency's decision in as 
much depth as possible. Decisions are considered arbitrary and ca-
pricious if the facts upon which they are purportedly based are not 
supported by the record}1 Factual certainty, however, is not neces-
sary; the administrator may regulate even though the facts do not 
illuminate a "clear path."42 
When reviewing actions within the scope of an administrator's 
discretion, the court "must consider whether the decision was based 
on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has 
been a clear error of judgment. "43 The reviewing court should not 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency but must engage in a 
substantial inquiry and a thorough, probing, in-depth review,44 
This substantial inquiry or "hard look" doctrine means that 
courts will accept nothing less than fairly conceived, fully explained 
and rationally based administrative discretionary judgments. 
Courts undertake careful scrutiny to assure that agencies (1) abide 
37 [d. § § 552, 553. 
3. [d. § 706(2)(A). 
" Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) . 
•• Louisiana v. Mathews, 427 F. Supp. 174 (D. La. 1977). 
" National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Comm., 555 
F.2d 938, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1977), citing Ethyl Corporation v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) . 
.. [d. 
" Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 417 (1971), citing L. JAFFE, 
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, 182 (1965) . 
.. [d. at 416. 
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by fair and reasonable procedures; (2) give good faith consideration 
to matters assigned to them; and (3) produce results that are defen-
sible in reason. 45 
The importance of a complete administrative record cannot be 
over-emphasized. Courts usually defer to the expertise of an agency 
like EPA unless the record is found incomplete,4a For example, in 
American Paper Institute v. Train,47 the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia stressed the fact that a court may not substi-
tute its judgment for that of EPA.48 However, the court also said 
that, in reviewing an effluent limitation, it must ensure that the 
Agency's decision had a rational basis and rested on a consideration 
of all relevant factors." Moreover, the court's inquiry must be 
searching and careful, especially in highly technical cases.50 
In sum, the record must demonstrate that the administrator con-
sidered all relevant factors and made a rational judgment based 
solely on the record. It must also show that the administrator met 
all the requirements of the APA as well as other requirements con-
tained in the empowering legislation. 
IV. CHALLENGES TO EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS 
The complicated way in which effluent limitations are developed, 
and the lengthy records which often result, provide a host of grounds 
for challenges. Nevertheless, challenges can be divided into three 
main categories: procedural, statutory, and substantive. 
Procedural challenges to effluent limitations generally concern 
EPA's failure to satisfy the APA requirements of fair notice of im-
pending regulations and proper publication of such regulations. 
Very few effluent limitations have been struck down through proce-
dural challenges. Moreover, the frequency of procedural defects has 
decreased as EPA has become more familiar with its procedural 
duties. 
Challenges based on statutory grounds involve attacks on EPA's 
.. Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 
509, 511 (1974) . 
.. See, e.g., American Paper !nst. v. Train, 543 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir. 1976); American Meat 
Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975); Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Corp. v. Train, 
537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976). 
" 543 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir. 1976) . 
• s [d. at 338 . 
.. [d. 
'" [d. 
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interpretation of the Act itself. Generally, a reviewing court will 
accept the Agency's construction of the controlling statute if it is 
"sufficiently reasonable."51 In statutory challenges, litigants have 
tested the general scope of regulations, EPA's assessment of certain 
factors which the Act requires the Agency to consider and EPA's 
allowance for variations from the regulations. 
Substantive challenges concern the Agency's use of its judgment 
in developing effluent limitations. The "arbitrary and capricious," 
and "clear error of judgment" standards apply to substantive chal-
lenges. EPA's use of discretion has been challenged in such matters 
as its subcategorization of each industry and its choice of pollution 
control technology for each industry. Substantive challenges also 
include challenges to EPA's general regulation-making methodol-
ogy; when this methodology shows some gap in logic a court will 
remand the regulations. 52 
A. Procedural Challenges 
Challenges to effluent limitations based on procedural defects 
have generally been based on EPA's failure to give adequate notice 
of impending regulations. The APA requires such notice so that 
interested parties can participate in the rule making through the 
submission of written (or other) data bearing on the proposed limi-
tations.53 Other procedural challenges have rested on faulty publica-
tion of the limitations or the lack of a general statement summariz-
ing their basis and purpose. 54 
1. Notice 
In American Iron and Steel v. EPA 55 the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit sustained the specialty steel industry's challenge to 
interim iron and steel limitations based on faulty notice of EPA's 
proposed rulemaking. The court said that EPA must sufficiently 
apprise all interested parties of its plans to issue regulations. 56 It 
stated the test to be whether the notice given fairly apprised inter-
ested parties of the subjects and issues before the Agency. 57 In a 
I. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1974). 
12 See text at notes 113-124, infra. 
12 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b), (c) (1976). 
If See id. §§ 552-53. 
II 568 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1977). 
II [d. at 291. 
"' [d. 
1979] FWPCA-INDUSTRIAL CHALLENGES 553 
similar case concerning adequate notice, the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia struck down a limitation for a particular 
pollutant in the potato processing industry for want of notice and a 
public comments period. 58 
EPA is free to adopt a rule which is "different-even substantially 
different from the proposed rule."5e Thus, in the second part of the 
opinion mentioned above, the American Iron and Steel court upheld 
interim regulations for the carbon steel industry even though they 
were more stringent than the previously proposed regulations and 
required the use of pollution control technology not clearly identi-
fied in the previously proposed regulations.80 However, the industry 
must have some warning. One court of appeals recently struck down 
a limitation for sulfite mills due to faulty notice and comment pro-
cedures.81 The court stated that EPA must give public notice and 
allow for public comments on every incremental change in its con-
clusions which is not the "logical outgrowth" of the preceding notice 
and comment process.82 
The notice issue becomes confused when EPA issues proposed 
limitations for a number of industries in one publication. This prob-
lem arose in American Iron and Steel, where the court said, in effect, 
that the Agency's consideration of certain pollution control technol-
ogies for some subcategories gave interested parties notice that EPA 
might apply these technologies to other subcategories in the same 
industry.83 Thus, reviewing courts and industry must be aware of all 
other regulations before they can determine if proper notice was 
given. 
2. Defects in Publication 
Publication of the proposed regulation must be complete and con-
cise. In Appalachian Power Company v. Train,84 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit invalidated an effluent limitation be-
cause of an omission in its publication. EPA had intended certain 
58 American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976) . 
• , American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 293 (3d Cir. 1977) . 
.. Id. 
01 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
" Id. at 1031. Ironically, the court in this case praised the majority of the challenged 
limitations saying that the EPA had "bent over backwards to accommodate public participa-
tion in, and the understanding of, the effluent limitations." Id. at 1028. 
'3 American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 293 (3d Cir. 1977) . 
.. 566 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1977). 
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information contained in its development document'5 for cooling 
water intake structures to be incorporated into its regulations. The 
regulations were remanded because the development document was 
neither published in the Federal Register nor properly incorporated 
into the published regulations by reference." In CPC International 
u. Train,87 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit remanded a 
"new-source" technology regulation because it was too vague. The 
court said that the regulations must be specific enough to warn 
industry of the scope of prohibited conduct.'8 However, courts are 
not likely to be overly demanding on this issue. For example, the 
Second Circuit upheld an effluent limitation challenged on the 
grounds that EPA had omitted both a "reference to the legal author-
ity under which the rule is proposed," and "a concise general state-
ment of their basis and purpose."'· The court found these require-
ments satisfied by a combination of the notice of proposed rulemak-
ing and the publication of the final regulations (especially the 
preamble of the regulations), in spite of their "self-serving charac-
teristics. "70 
The procedural standards for effluent limitations set out in the 
APA have been refined through numerous interpretations. Although 
procedural defects have troubled EPA in the past, successful proce-
dural challenges have declined as the Agency has become more 
familiar with the required standards. This decline should continue 
in the future. 
B. Statutory Challenges 
Statutory challenges to effluent limitations have generally been 
based on one of three grounds: EPA's failure to adequately consider 
factors enumerated in the statute, EPA's failure to permit variation 
from the effluent limitations and EPA's promulgation of regulations 
that exceed the scope of the statute. 
1. Consideration of Factors 
In order to limit the risk that EPA would develop effluent limita-
II See text at note 20, supra. 
II Appalachian Power Company v. Train, 566 F.2d 451,454-57 (4th Cir. 1977). 
17 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975). 
II ld. at 1052. 
II Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976). 
7, ld. at 630. 
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tions that would have a disastrous effect on the nation's economy, 
Congress included in the Act a requirement that the Agency con-
sider certain factors while developing the limitations. While some 
of the factors which the Agency must consider vary with each type 
of limitation, EPA must consider the cost of the limitation and its 
non-water quality environmental impact, including energy require-
ments, as it develops effluent limitations for all four technology 
levels. 71 The statute provides special cost-benefit tests for the 
"practicable" and "conventional" technology standards.72 In addi-
tion, for the three standards that apply to existing plants 
("practicable," "available" and "conventional" technologies, but 
not "new-source" performance standards), EPA must take into ac-
count "the age of equipment and facilities involved, the process 
employed, the engieering aspects of the application of various types 
of control techniques, [and] process changes."73 
In developing regulations for the "practicable" technology level, 
EPA must perform a cost-benefit analysis. More precisely, the stat-
ute requires that EPA weigh the total cost of application of the 
technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be 
achieved from such application.74 The test is "intended to limit the 
application of technology only where the additional degree of ef-
fluent reduction is wholly out of proportion to the costs of achieving 
such marginal level of reduction. "75 At the very least, the adminis-
trative record for ~ "practicable" standard must show that industry 
costs were considered.78 
The cost considerations for "conventional" technology effluent 
limitations seem, from the language of the Act, to involve a cost-
benefit test similar to the one required for "practicable" technol-
ogy.77 Specifically, EPA must consider the reasonableness of the 
71 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(b)(1)(B), (2)(B), 1316(b)(1)(B) (1976); Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 48(b), 
91 Stat. 1566 (1977), to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B). 
72 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (1976) ("practicable"); Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 48(b), 91 Stat. 
1566 (1977), to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B) ("conventional"). 
73 33 U.S.C.A. § 1314(b) (West 1978). 
" 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (1976). 
70 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DIVISION OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS of 1972,93 CONGo 1ST SESS. 170 (Comm. 
Print 1973), (emphasis in original). -
7. E.!. du Pont de Nemours and CO. V. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1037 (4th Cir. 1976), modified, 
430 U.S. 112 (1977); Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, modified, 545 F.2d 1380 
(4th Cir. 1976). 
77 Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (1976) with Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 48(b), 91 Stat. 1566 
(1977), to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B). 
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relationship between the costs of attaining a reduction in effluents 
and the effluent reduction benefits derived. 78 Thus, EPA must con-
sider both costs and benefits and determine whether or not they are 
reasonably related. The conventional technology standard was spe-
cifically developed for situations where the added benefits would 
not justify the costs involved in requiring the more stringent 
"available" technology levels of treatment. 79 However, there are as 
yet no reported challenges to "conventional" technology limita-
tions, so it is difficult to know what standards will govern such 
challenges. 
For "available" technology and "new-source" performance stan-
dards, the Agency must only "consider COSt."80 The Act does not 
specify the degree of consideration of the cost factor required for 
these limitations, therefore leaving that determination to the discre-
tion of the Agency. Thus, cost consideration challenges to these two 
types of standards will succeed only when EPA's consideration of 
the cost factor was arbitrary and capricious.8! Moreover, since the 
Agency need not perform a cost-benefit analysis, per se, it need not 
document the benefits to society arising from the control of pollu-
tants from a particular point source.82 However, the courts have 
determined that for "new-source" standards EPA must show that 
the costs can be "reasonably" borne by the industry. 83 The Agency 
may also have to show that its economic analysis used all the rele-
vant data and that this data was accurate and up-to-date. 84 
78 Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 48(b), 91 Stat. 1566 (1977), to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 
1314(b)(4)(B). In addition, EPA must make a "comparison of the cost and level of reduction 
of such pollutants from the discharge from publicly owned treatment works to the cost and 
level of reduction of such pollutants from a class or category of industrial sources." Id. 
" H.R. REP. No. 95-830, 95th Congo 1st Sess. 85, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 4424, 4460. 
8. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(b)(2)(B), 1316(b)(I)(B) (1976). 
81 Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1365, modified, 545 F.2d 1380 (4th Cir. 
1976). The discussion in the text distinguishes between the language of the cost consideration 
requirements for different technology levels, as was done by the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia, in Weyerhaeuser CO. V. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978). However, 
other Circuits have reviewed EPA cost consideration for "practicable" and "available" tech-
nology effluent limitations as if the requirements were identical. See, e.g., National Renderers 
Ass'n. V. EPA, 541 F.2d 1281, 1287-89 (8th Cir. 1976); California & Hawaiian Sugar CO. V. 
EPA, 553 F.2d 280, 288 (2d Cir. 1977). 
82 California and Hawaiian Sugar CO. V. EPA, 553 F.2d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1977). 
83 CPC International, Inc. V. Train, 540 F.2d 1329, 1342 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 
U.S. 966 (1977) . 
.. National Renderers Ass'n. V. EPA, 541 F.2d 1281, 1288 (8th Cir. 1976), but see California 
and Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. EPA, 553 F.2d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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Challengers of effluent limitations have also cited the age of the 
equipment and facilities involved as being improperly considered by 
EPA. As with the cost factor in "available" technology and "new-
source" performance standards, the degree of consideration required 
for this factor is not specified in the Act and is left to the discretion 
of the Agency.85 However, the age of the equipment and facilities 
must at least be considered. In American Iron and Steel Institute 
v. EPA,88 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded an 
interim iron and steel effluent limitation because the Agency impro-
perly failed to consider the bearing of the age of the equipment and 
facilities involved on the cost and feasibility of retrofitting plants 
with new pollution control technology.87 The court said that EPA 
must consider the age of the equipment and facilities involved un-
less the Agency has specifically found that age has no bearing on the 
cost or feasibility of retrofitting plants with pollution control tech-
nology.88 The court explained that it might have accepted EPA's 
argument that age has little or no bearing on retrofit because the 
concept of plant age itself is difficult to define. However, an earlier 
court order in the American Iron and Steel Institute case required 
EPA to make a specific finding on the significance of the age factor, 
thereby forcing the court to remand the contested limitation, al-
though only for the purpose of having EPA "consider" age. HD 
Finally, EPA must consider "non-water quality environmental 
factors. "90 Water scarcity is one such factor. DI Thus when an indus-
try challenged a technology standard that involved poor water con-
servation practices, the reviewing court upheld EPA, saying that it 
could not conclude that it was "arbitrary or capricious of EPA to 
consider the water scarcity problem by comparing the benefits in 
pollution reduction attributable to ea~ch phase of its regulations with 
the loss in water resources attributable to that phase."D2 In 
California and Hawaiian Sugar Company v. EPA, D3 the Court of 
.. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1045-46 (D.C. Cir. 1978) . 
.. 568 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1977). 
87 Id. at 299 . 
.. Id . 
.. Id . 
•• As with cost and age factors, non-water quality environmental factors are also left to 
Agency discretion. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1045-46 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
" American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284,308 (3d Cir. 1977). See also Appa-
lachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1368-71, modified, 545 F.2d 1380 (4th Cir. 1976). 
" American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 308 (3d Cir. 1977). 
" 553 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld effluent limitations for the 
crystalline cane sugar refining industry despite charges that EPA 
had improperly failed to consider such non-water quality environ-
mental impact factors as land conservation, energy consumption, 
and fogging and noise caused by cooling towers.D4 The court found 
that EPA had adequately considered such factors. 
2. Variances 
EPA uses two techniques to account for differences between indi-
vidual plants in a given industry: subcategorization and variance. 
The Agency divides an industry's plants into discrete subcategories 
for which separate effluent limitations are issued. D5 Plants which do 
not fit a definite subcategory are subject to special variance provi-
sions. Subcategorization is a matter of EPA judgment, thus creating 
a substantive problem which will be discussed later. D6 Challenges to 
variance provisions, which are mandated by the Act, involve EPA's 
interpretation of the Act as modified by case law. 
While the Act explicitly requires that EPA include a variance 
provision in its "available" technology limitations, it contains no 
such variance provision for "practicable" technology limitations.D7 
However, the Supreme Court in E.!. du Pont de Nemours and Co. 
v. Train 98 read the Act to require a variance provision in both 
"available" and "practicable" technology limitations. DD The Court 
also held that the Act forbids variance provisions for "new-source" 
performance standards. loo 
The du Pont case clearly established that EPA must include vari-
ance provisions in both its "available" and "practicable" technol-
ogy limitations. However, it also raised the question of the justicia-
bility of challenges to these variance provisions, specifically focus-
ing on whether variance provisions can be challenged in the context 
of a review of a general set of limitations or whether a separate suit 
must be brought by each plant that is denied a variance. In 
.. See also Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
IS See text at note 20, supra. 
II See text at notes 125-32, infra. 
" See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976). However, there is a provision for modifying "available" 
technology for non-conventional pollutants. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(g) (West 1978). 
os 430 U.S. 112 (1977) . 
.. Id. at 128. 
'00 Id. at 138. The Act provides no authority for case-by-case exemptions from 
"conventional" technology limitations. 
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Weyerhaeuser Company v. Costle,IOI the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia concluded that a narrow review of a variance 
provision is allowable in the context of a review of a general set of 
limitations,l°2 The court stressed, however, that this review must be 
limited to a determination of whether the variance provision "can 
be applied with enough flexibility to support the general rule making 
effort. "103 
To determine whether EPA had met this "minimum-
flexibility"104 requirement, the Weyerhaeuser court examined EPA's 
variance philosophy . EPA will generally allow a discharger a vari-
ance from an effluent limitation only if the discharger can show that 
the technical and engineering factors which EPA considered while 
establishing the limitation are fundamentally different from the 
discharger's equipment and facilities. 105 However, the Weyerhaeuser 
court approved EPA's position of denying variances when only cost 
factors constitute the fundamental difference. lOS In support of this 
position, the court cited language in the legislative history showing 
that supporters of the Act "acknowledged and accepted the possibil-
ity that its 1977 requirements might cause individual plants to' go 
out ofbusiness."107 The court also stated that, in making its variance 
decisions, EPA need not consider the benefits to local water quality 
which result from enforcement of the limitations,l°s In approving the 
challenged variance provisions, the court noted that the Agency had 
built a significant degree of flexibility into the regulations them-
selves through its intensive study of the industry and its attempts 
to account for the information uncovered by that study. IOD 
In sum, for a variance clause to be valid, it must permit a variance 
when a plant differs in some fundamental aspect from the rest of 
the plants in its subcategory. The danger of variance provisions that 
101 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
IIIZ [d. at 2163. See also Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1358·60, n.22, 
modified, 545 F.2d 1380 (4th Cir. 1976). 
103 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
104 Id. 
, .. [d. at 1038. The fundamentally different standard also applies in direct challenges to 
the denial or revocation of a variance. In re Louisana-Pacific Corp., 10 E.R.C. 1841, 1850 
(EPA 1977) (administrative decision). 
I" 590 F.2d at 1038. But see Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1359, modified, 
545 F.2d 1380 (4th Cir. 1976). 
1.' 590 F.2d at 1036. 
I •• [d. at 1042. 
I .. Id. at 1040. 
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are too broad results from the probability of their over-use by permit 
grantors. If variances are given too freely, the purpose of the Act 
could be effectively frustrated. Thus, variance provisions must be 
broad enough to. prevent remand but narrow enough to prevent 
overuse. 
3. Limitations Exceeding the Scope of the Statute 
Effluent limitations have also been challenged as exceeding the 
scope of the Act. For example, the Act does not authorize EPA to 
regulate treatment of storm water runoff or other pollution caused 
by non-point sources,'lO nor does it authorize EPA to require indus-
try to remove pollutants which enter a plant through intake 
streams.HI The Act has, however, been interpreted as giving EPA 
the power to regulate disposal of pollutants into deep wells when it 
undertakes such regulation in conjunction with limitations on a 
plant's discharges into surface waters."2 
C. Substantive Challenges 
Substantive challenges to discretionary actions taken by EPA in 
establishing effluent limitations have generally been based on one 
of three grounds: faults in EPA's general regulation-developing 
methodology, EPA's improper subcategorization of an industry or 
EPA's improper choice of pollution control technology. 
1. EPA's General Regulation-Developing Methodology 
Challenges to EPA's regulation-developing methodology can be 
divided into two general groups: attacks on EPA's data base and 
attacks on EPA's logic. EPA has used a variety of sources of data 
in establishing effluent limitations. The Agency's practice of using 
effluent data from the plants in an industrial subcategory with the 
most effective pollution control technology to develop "practicable" 
technology limitations has been unanimously upheld. ll3 In fact, the 
Agency can use data from exemplary plants that are not even 10-
III American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1035 (lOth Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
430 U.S. 922; Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351,1373, modified, 545 F.2d 1380 
(4th Cir. 1976). 
III Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351,1377, modified, 545 F.2d 1380 (4th Cir. 
1976). 
112 United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 852 (7th Cir. 1977). 
lIS See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973,978 (4th Cir. 1976); Hooker Chemicals and 
Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 632 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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cated in the United States,1I4 and even though the plants have in-
stalled the advanced pollution control technology solely to meet 
strict state water quality standards. 1I5 When no exemplary plants 
exist in a given industrial subcategory, EPA can look to other subca-
tegories, and even to other industries, for appropriate pollution con-
trol technology. 118 
For "available" technology limitations, EPA can rely on scientific 
literature to support its conclusion that the selected technology will 
be available in 1983.117 The Agency must, however, specify what 
sections of a given publication it has relied upon so that its reason-
ing can be traced. liS 
In addition, courts have also upheld the Agency's use of state 
water quality standardsll9 and its use of data obtained from other 
effluent limitation studies. '20 EPA can even require an industry to 
monitor itself in order to acquire the needed data. '21 Thus, it seems 
that EPA can use data from almost any available source in develop-
ing effluent limitations. 
More frequently, problems arise because the Agency has based its 
regulations on data that is either incorrect or incomplete, revealing 
gaps in the logic the Agency used in exercising its discretion. If the 
record does not completely document EPA's reasoning, the affected 
limitation will be remanded. '22 On the other hand, proving that the 
Agency made a clear error of judgment poses a difficult task. Due 
to the complex nature of the decisions EPA must make while devel-
oping an effluent limitation, the courts will usually defer to the 
Agency's expertise unless some defect in the record can be shown. 12:1 
As long as the record shows that EPA adequately considered the 
relevant factors and the record supports the Agency's conclusions, 
the courts will usually accept the administrator's judgment. 124 
III American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107, 140 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
115 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costie, 590 F.2d 1011, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
118 California and Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. EPA, 553 F.2d 280, 286 (2d Cir. 1977). 
117 Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 636 (2d Cir. 1976). 
lIS [d. 
"' United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 835 (7th Cir. 1977). 
120 Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 639, 641 (2d Cir. 1976). 
121 United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 850-51 (7th Cir. 1977). 
122 Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 639, 646 (2d Cir. 1976). 
123 See text at notes 43-44, supra. 
121 See, e.g., American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1977). 
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2. EPA's Industry Subcategorization 
Some of the earliest effluent limitations promulgated were chal-
lenged because EPA had not issued a separate regulation for each 
point source,125 but instead, had subcategorized each industry by 
such various factors as the manufacturing processes employed and 
the types of products produced. EPA claimed that this subcategori-
zation adequately accounted for the diversity in each industry. 
Courts generally have supported EPA's position, upholding subca-
tegorization as a substitute for individualized regulations. 126 EPA's 
mode and basis of subcategorization, however, are still subject to 
challenges as being arbitrary and capricious. 
Challengers of EPA's subcategorization have generally argued 
that the Agency failed to take into account enough factors when it 
divided an industry into subcategories. Generally speaking, EPA 
must take into account all relevant factors in its subcategorization 
process. The Agency must consider factors other than simply the 
manufacturing processes employed.127 Determining whether a factor 
is relevant to subcategorization is a discretionary matter, so that the 
arbitrary and capricious standard applies. Industry has argued at 
various times that EPA has failed to sufficiently consider several 
factors that are important to the subcategorization process, includ-
ing the age of equipment and facilities involved,128 climate,129 vol-
ume of water flow from piantsl30 and the profitability of processes 
used to recover certain pollutants. 131 Because sub categorization is a 
discretionary function which depends on the specific industry in-
volved, there do not seem to be any iron-clad rules concerning which 
factors the Agency must take into account when subcategorizing. 
Nonetheless, it seems that economic factors need not be considered 
when subcategorizing.132 Thus, as with EPA's consideration of such 
I" See, e.g., Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976); 
FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1976). 
121 E.!. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977). 
127 American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 299 (3d Cir. 1976). 
12' [d. at 299. 
12. Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 634 (2d Cir. 1976). 
130 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
131 [d. at 1056. 
132 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that economic factors need not 
be considered in variance provisions. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 
1978). Since industry subcategorization is another form of variance, allowing for differences 
between subcategories, a similar result would probably obtain if challengers raised cost in a 
subcategorization suit. 
.. 
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factors as the age of facilities and equipment involved and the non-
water quality environmental impact, the Agency's consideration of 
subcategorization factors will generally be upheld if the record 
shows that these factors were, in fact, merely considered. 
3. EPA's Selection of Pollution Control Technology 
In challenging EPA's choice of pollution control technology, in-
dustry generally has argued either that EPA's chosen technology is 
not available or that the technology is not effective. The 1972 Act 
required EPA to develop three types of regulations ("practicable" 
and "available" technology and "new-source" performance stan-
dards) and the 1977 Amendments added a fourth ("conventional" 
technology) .133 Each of these limitations is based on technology that 
is either in current use ("practicable"), demonstrated as usable in 
the industry ("new-source" performance standards and 
"conventional") or expected to be available to the industry when 
enforcement begins ("available") .134 
For each type of regulation it promulgates, EPA must present. 
different evidence as to the availability of the technology on which 
the regulation was based. For example, for the "practicable" limita-
tions the Agency must show that the technology is currently in use 
at the exemplary plants in the industry in question,135 or that the 
technology can be transferred from another industryl36 or that there 
are a number of possible acceptable technologies of which one pre-
sumably will work at every plant in the industry.137 For "new-
source" performance standards, the Agency must show that the 
technology relied on in promulgating the limitations is both avail-
able and demonstrated. 13s To be demonstrated, however, a technol-
ogy need not necessarily be in use in the industry in question.I:lU 
'33 See Section II, supra. 
13' [d. 
'35 Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 632 (2d Cir. 1976). 
13. Tanner's Council of America, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1188, 1192 (4th Cir. 1976). When 
EPA requires the use of transfer technology, it cannot simply presume that the technology 
is transferable from one industry to another. CPC International, Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 
1048-49 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977). The agency must have a reasonable 
basis for believing that the technology is transferable from one industry to another before it 
can require the use of the technology by the other industry. [d. at 1048. 
137 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
'35 Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 639, 641 (2d Cir. 1976). 
'30 CPC International, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329, 1334-38 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
430 U.S. 966 (1977). 
• 
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Thus, "new-source" performance standards based on transfer tech-
nology were upheld in CPC International v. Train. 140 
Certain requirements in the Act mandate that challenges to 
"available" technology limitations be made far in advance of the 
actual enforcement of these limitations. l41 Courts are thus presented 
with an anomaly since they must determine whether EPA can rea-
sonably expect its "available" technology to be available for all 
plants in the industry in 1984. Thus, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit struck down an "available" technology limitation 
when it determined that EPA had insufficient reason to believe that 
the selected technology would be available to plants in cold climates 
by the original 1983 cut-off year .142 
EPA must also show that the technology on which it bases its 
effluent limitations is indeed capable of achieving them. 143 In other 
words, when EPA bases a limitation on a certain type of technology, 
it must show that the use of that technology will permit an industry 
to meet the limitation. 144 While the Agency need not estimate the 
total amount of pollution reduction attainable through the use of its 
selected technology, it must show that the selected technology can 
at least achieve some effluent limitation. u5 
EPA need not, however, make "excursion" or "upset" provi-
sions}48 In other words, EPA does not have to allow variances for 
plants that employ its selected technology but still cannot achieve 
its pollution concentration standards. A plant that does everything 
in its power to meet the EPA-developed regulations can thus still 
140 Id. at 1334·38. 
14' 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (1976). 
142 Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 634 (2d Cir. 1976). Al-
though when Hooker was decided the cut-off year was 1983, Congress changed it to 1984 in 
the 1977 Amendments. Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 42, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977), to be codified at 33 
U.S.C. § 13ll(b). 
143 See, e.g., American Paper Inst. v. Train, 543 F.2d 328, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
, .. Id. For the "available" technology limitations EPA must show that it can "reasonably 
expect" the selected technology to achieve the standards. Id. at 353; American Meat Inst. v. 
EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 463 (7th Cir. 1975). 
14' American Paper Inst. v. Train, 543 F.2d 328, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
'48 Corn Refiners Ass'n, Inc. v. Costle, 594 F.2d 1223 (8th Cir. 1979); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. 
Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Contra, Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th 
Cir. 1977). 
An "excursion" or "upset" has been described as "a situation in which effluent limita-
tions are unintentionally exceeded for reasons beyond the reasonable control of the permittee 
and in spite of the proper operation of treatment facilities meeting the statutorily required 
technological criterion." Corn Refiners Ass'n, Inc. v. Costle, 594 F.2d 1223, 1224 (8th Cir. 
1979). 
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be subject to fines for failure to achieve them. While this situation 
seems unfair, courts have accepted it for three reasons. First, such 
a ruling forces industry to develop the technology necessary to avoid 
violation of the regulations. 147 Second, excursion provisions would 
prevent the "swift and direct" enforcement the Act contemplates. 14K 
Finally, the courts have felt that the decision to prosecute in such 
cases should be left to the Agency's discretion. 149 
V. CONCLUSION 
A discussion of industrial challenges to effluent limitations raises 
several points. First, EPA has an affirmative duty to develop ef-
fluent limitations that can withstand all possible procedural, statu-
tory and substantive challenges. EPA, being a government agency, 
has as its primary function the duty to serve the public. Limitations 
that are based on faulty data or logic do not serve the public even 
if they survive judicial scrutiny. Such limitations might severely 
damage the economy, thereby resulting in public animosity towards 
EPA and its efforts to abate water pollution. Furthermore, industry 
is also a part of the public, so that it too has a right to fair regula-
tions. 
Second, strict enforcement of the procedural requirement of fair 
notice may present the best way to insure fair regulations. If an 
industry knows that, unless it acts, it will be forced to install expen-
sive pollution control technology, that industry most likely will 
come forth with every available shred of information in order to 
inform EPA of potential problems. With full information, the 
Agency will be better equipped to develop regulations that are fair 
to all parties concerned. 
In the future, challenges to effluent limitations will be increas-
ingly technical, based primarily on substantive grounds. Procedural 
challenges, alleging faulty notice or improper publication will be 
less likely to succeed given EPA's demonstrated procedural acu-
men and the well-defined standards review courts have used in 
these cases. Procedural challenges should not, however, be over-
looked. Moreover, recent decisions defining the standards for factors 
to be considered and industry subcategorization should also provide 
EPA with some guidance in these areas, thereby decreasing the 
.47 Com Refiners Ass'n, Inc. v. Castle, 594 F.2d 1223, 1226 (8th Cir. 1979) . 
... [d . 
•• 1 [d. 
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likelihood of successful challenges to new limitations. Thus, chal-
lenges bases on substantive grounds and variance provisions may be 
expected to make up the bulk of future challenges. However, the 
courts have demonstrated that EPA's judgment will be respected if 
it can show, through the administrative record, that it has ade-
quately considered all relevant factors and has acted on correct 
data. Most successful challenges will therefore occur when some 
part of the record can be proven to be incorrect or incomplete. 
Finally, while this article has attempted to categorize and define 
the industrial challenges to effluent limitation so far presented, in-
dustry has not exhausted all possible areas for effluent limitation 
challenges. In particular, challenges to EPA's scientific methodol-
ogy have been under-utilized. In the future, industry should closely 
examine the quality control used by EPA and its contractors in 
gathering data in order to uncover specific factual errors as well as 
general logical inconsistencies. Only through close scrutiny of EPA's 
regulation-developing procedures can industry guarantee fair ef-
fluent limitations. 
